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Approved For Release 1999/09/08 : CIA-RDP80-01446R000100040004-9

1 May 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Attn: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: IG Report

In view of the fact that I was closely connected with the organizational preparations for work on International Communism, I should like to sketch briefly some of the salient points of criticism of the IG report.

1. The report consists mainly of a historical narrative which omits important phases in the history of the preparation for Communist intelligence production.

2. Generally, the report shows a considerable lack of understanding concerning the particular tasks with which SRS is charged. 25X1A9a There was little reference to the pertinent passages in [REDACTED] memorandum to the DCI, the essence of which seems to have been disregarded.

3. No consideration has been given to the fact that the SRS charter was extremely vague and generalized and that SRS consequently was compelled to try to implement the charter in the way which seemed best, and on the basis of the IAC documents pertaining to the setting up of the organizations in question. I may refer to my memorandum to the DD/I of 21 September 1955, i.e. following the publication of the IAC documents, in which I stated in paragraph 1:

"I submit that the organization and the responsibilities of the SRPS" (as it was then tentatively called, the P standing for Planning) "as outlined in the above mentioned paper" (referring to IAC-D-99 of 22 August 1955) "are couched in such general terms as to require concise interpretations and directives if the SRPS is to become effective and efficient."

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DECLASSIFIED
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 1
1. DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S (C)
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1992
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 24 MAY 82 BY: [REDACTED]
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In paragraph 2 I stated:

" . . . The paper does not state in what tangible form the results of these efforts should be produced and into what channels they should be directed. Although the SRPS is in the DD/I area, the spirit of the [REDACTED] paper appears to indicate that the Staff's role in the field of International Communism may be compared roughly speaking with that of ONE in the intelligence community. "

Finally, I recommended in paragraph 3 that upon the establishment of SRS, provisions be made for "giving the staff a firm organizational standing vis-a-vis the new DDP - State combination, as well as in the intelligence community and issuing a directive clarifying SRPS's responsibilities in the substantive field. "

4. SRS has been left to its own devices, confronting a basically hostile DD/P which, from the very beginning, impeded that part of SRS activities which called for "countering communism. "

5. As I understand it, it was the Director's view that SRS's special task was to stimulate thought even if such thought did deviate from the accepted Agency or intelligence community views. I imagine that at the bottom of this concept was the desire on the part of the Director to create a fresh approach in the Agency that would help it to avoid getting into a rut and becoming entangled in clichés. The IG report has disregarded this part of SRS activities. Yet there is considerable evidence to the effect that in spite of the short time of its existence SRS has indeed succeeded in exerting considerable influence inside and outside the Agency and that some of SRS's most important concepts were directly or indirectly incorporated into some important intelligence productions. (I am referring particularly to the influence of SRS-6, "Status and Prospects of International Communism: The Dialectic of Crisis and Stabilization" on the drafters of the big Soviet NIE 11-4-57).

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25X1A8a 6. It seems absurd to compare the paper production of [REDACTED] and SRS. [REDACTED] consists of more than 40 people. If we estimate that at least 25 of them are substantive analysts and that the complement of SRS is between 5 and 6, working without or with very little research assistance, then the production of SRS has been far higher than that

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of [REDACTED] However, SRS was not set up to show its effectiveness by quantitative production. It was set up for its staff members to be able to think and produce thought pieces that could not be produced elsewhere, either in this Agency or in the government. However, these think pieces were not supposed to be purely academic, but to be conceived in constant touch with the machinery of government.

25X1A9a It can be surmised that [REDACTED] realized, as did the IAC, that a purely academic outfit, separated from the government, could not take into consideration the vital information and points of departure, and therefore SRS was to be a mixture of governmental and academic working procedure.

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7. It seems regrettable that, if a comparison between [REDACTED] and SRS production is made at all, the titles of the papers have been quoted by themselves as "exhibits." It occurs to me that some of the most important papers, such as SRS-6 or SRS-3, have not been mentioned at all. Rather those papers have been picked which might indicate similarity or overlapping with [REDACTED] production. The 25X1A8a vagueness in the IAC paper as to what [REDACTED] was to produce with its 25X1A8a enlarged staff appears to have led to confusion as to how far [REDACTED] 25X1A8a could go in publishing DD/I type documents. But even these documents can not compare with productions of the SRS series. [REDACTED] 25X1A8a papers are, by and large, narratives with quotations which are extremely useful for operational purposes but are more or less devoid of speculation and estimation, which is the particular province of SRS.

8. Most surprising is the fact that the IG report completely ignores the tri-partite organization of International Communist intelligence as it was envisaged by the IAC. No 25X1A1a mention was made of the fact that the State Department is receiving [REDACTED] a year from CIA under the NIS provisions for increased production of intelligence on Communism in individual states. I submit that the intelligence community does not get its money's worth from these activities. I recommend that the prerogative of the Director to enquire into such intelligence activities, even outside CIA, be exercised and that an investigation be made of how the [REDACTED] 25X1A1a subsidy is being used, and whether it would be advisable to curtail this and use it to build up a more complete Communism coverage in CIA.

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9. The [REDACTED] proposals, as they were finally drafted in the IAC document, were clearly a compromise. I have for many years maintained that the only way to deal with intelligence on International Communism is to create a single shop within the Agency as a matter of common concern for the entire intelligence community. This shop should not be attached to either DD/I or DD/P but either be under the jurisdiction of the DCI or become a free floating unit, enabled by the Director to cross lines every time it considers it necessary, and to go to every component of the Agency, of other government agencies, and such outside institutions as are particularly concerned with International Communism.

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10. If this is not possible, I suggest that [REDACTED] be limited to operational support activities and that a new and more complete unit assume SRS duties, and be set up in the DCI's office, so as to be able to cross DD/I and DD/P lines whenever necessary. Inasmuch as Mr. Dulles is the Director of Central Intelligence of the United States, the IAC character of the unit's work should be emphasized by implementation of my recommendations in the aforementioned memorandum of 21 September 1955 to DD/I, namely, that the new office be connected with an Interdepartmental Committee on International Communism that would considerably differ from the present IAC committee which is mainly handling requirements in that it would be substantive and could develop a government-wide program for International Communism intelligence. I think it would be organizationally wise if the head of the new outfit be the Chairman of this committee which, as a matter of fact, may well replace the present one.

11. In this connection, it is important to point out that while the IAC has no decision-making power over the type and character of a unit dealing with International Communism, its previous concern with such work has been repeatedly expressed and changes in the present organization may possibly be taken up by IAC members, particularly the Armed Forces.

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12. Whatever a new organization of work on International Communism may be, it is clear to me that this work can not be done outside the government. The recommendation of the IG to transfer SRS work to [REDACTED] demonstrates that the difference between purely academic work and intelligence that is on an intellectually and academically high level has been overlooked. Not only would such work be more or less out of touch with government policy and policy makers, but what is more important, it would gather dust on [REDACTED] shelves, come perhaps to the attention of some working level analysts, but basically remain without the slightest influence on the people in government who are of real importance and for whom SRS work is being done. Furthermore, the nature of [REDACTED] and the complete separation between the more or less academic world and the exigencies of the US government would practically neutralize all the value of what SRS or a similar outfit is supposed to do. The fact that SRS papers have carried a low classification is certainly not an indication of the fact that they are purely academic. Furthermore, it is not true that these papers could have been written outside the government, because they are the result not only of experience and training of the authors but at least as much of the knowledge of the needs of the government and the day to day contacts between the authors and government officials in CIA and elsewhere. (I might add that our influence in the field of International Communism on foreign governments would also be largely neutralized if such work were to be done in [REDACTED] or 25X1A5a1 any other academic institution).

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